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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from a conviction and sentence for two counts of robbery in violation of 
LC.§ 18-6501. The central issue is whether Mr. Hawkins was competent to stand trial in his 
case in January 2008. Mr. Hawkins argues below that the district court's 2010 decision that he 
was competent at the time of trial violated his right to due process. He also argues that the 
district court abused its discretion in permitting Mr. Hawkins to act as his own attorney without 
first determining whether he was competent to waive his right to the assistance of counsel. 
B. Prior Proceedings 
1. Trial proceedings 
In its Opinion reversing Mr. Hawkins' convictions for two counts of robbery and 
remanding his case for a new trial, the Court of Appeals reiterated the facts leading up to and 
following Mr. Hawkins' trial as follows: 
On December 15, 2005, Hawkins contacted retired Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) agent George Calley and expressed concerns about the safety 
of his sons who were incarcerated in Colorado for bank robbery. Calley was 
familiar with Hawkins and told Hawkins that he could not protect the boys but 
that he could put Hawkins in contact with a current agent of the FBI in Boise. 
Hawkins told Calley that he wanted to work with the FBI and that he had been 
working with an assistant United States Attorney in Portland, Oregon. The next 
day, December 16, 2005, Hawkins robbed a Key Bank in Boise by presenting a 
note that demanded $15,000 and threatened to shoot people if his demands were 
not met or if anyone tried to follow him. Photos of the robber were made by a 
security camera in the bank. Following the robbery, a teller at the bank identified 
Hawkins in a photographic line-up, but police were unable to locate Hawkins. 
After hearing and seeing news reports on the bank robbery, Calley informed law 
enforcement of his conversation with Hawkins and that he suspected Hawkins 
was the perpetrator. A few days later, Hawkins left a message on Calley's 
answering machine. Essentially, Hawkins said that since he had not heard from 
Calley, he assumed that Calley could not help him. Calley tried to call and email 
Hawkins back but his attempts to reach Hawkins were unsuccessful. 
Several months later, on June 6, 2006, Hawkins robbed a Washington Mutual 
Bank in Boise in the same manner as he had done in the Key Bank robbery, by 
presenting a note demanding $15,000 and threatening to shoot people. Again, a 
surveillance camera photographed the robber. As he was leaving with the money, 
Hawkins turned to the tellers and said, "By the way, my name is Faron Hawkins, 
and this is all because of George Calley." Hawkins called Calley a few days later 
and told him that he had used Calley's name in the bank robbery. Calley offered 
to help Hawkins find an attorney, but Hawkins did not respond to Calley's offer 
and terminated the conversation. 
On August 10, 2006, law enforcement located Hawkins at a campground near The 
Dalles, Oregon, where he was staying with his wife and children in a camp trailer. 
When an officer attempted to make contact with Hawkins at the camp trailer, 
Hawkins pointed a loaded gun at the officer. The officer retreated and, after the 
campground was evacuated, law enforcement officers surrounded the trailer and 
ordered Hawkins to come out. An eight-hour standoff ensued during which 
Hawkins fired a gun in the direction of the officers, but eventually allowed his 
wife and children to leave the trailer. Hawkins was finally taken into custody 
after the officers shot tear gas into the trailer, forcing Hawkins to come out. 
When interviewed by Oregon police, Hawkins stated that he had been a Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) operative, had knowledge of transportation of 
weapons to Canada, had been involved in a South American operation with a 
National Security Agency (NSA) advisor and, at some point, had cut a 
transponder out of his earlobe that had been placed there by "someone." Hawkins 
also claimed to be a sophisticated criminal and freely admitted that he had 
committed the December 16, 2005, Boise bank robbery. A warrant to search 
Hawkins' van, pickup, and camp trailer was obtained and executed. During the 
search, several items of clothing that matched the description of items used 
during the Boise bank robberies, together with a checkbook containing one of the 
robber's demand notes, were seized. When Hawkins was interviewed by an FBI 
agent he stated that his wife and stepson liked to spend money, and that his wife 
encouraged his stepson to rob banks to get more money. He also stated that he 
and his wife helped his stepson rob banks by monitoring police scanners, and that 
he had suggested to his stepson that he should rob banks by using a demand note. 
However, in subsequent interviews with the FBI agent, Hawkins stated that he and 
his stepson were forced to commit the robberies. Hawkins claimed that the men 
who forced him to rob the banks threatened his wife and children. He also 
claimed that the men put a bomb vest on him and threatened to detonate it if he 
did not rob the Key Bank, and again put a bomb vest on him and forced him to 
wear an earpiece when he robbed the Washington Mutual Bank. 
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A grand jury indicted Hawkins on two counts of robbery. Hawkins moved to 
proceed pro se, and after an extensive Faretta inquiry, the district court granted 
Hawkins' request for self-representation but also appointed a public defender as 
standby counsel. Later, Hawkins again requested that counsel be reappointed and 
the court granted his request. After that appointment, Hawkins changed his mind 
and again moved to proceed prose. The court conducted another Farreta inquiry, 
granted the motion, and appointed the public defender as standby counsel. On 
January 7, 2008, trial commenced and Hawkins testified on his own behalf. He 
admitted to the bank robberies, but claimed that they were done under duress. 
Hawkins stated that the people who forced him to commit the robberies did so by 
making threats to him, to his wife, and to his children. Ultimately, the jury found 
Hawkins guilty of the robberies. 
Hawkins filed a motion for new trial and then moved for reappointment of 
counsel, and the court granted this request. A few minutes later, Hawkins' 
counsel advised the court that Hawkins was dissatisfied with counsel's 
performance because counsel did not believe there was any basis to move for a 
mistrial or for a new trial. Hawkins requested that he be allowed to continue to 
pro se argue his motions. The district court noted that Hawkins had filed a motion 
to "dismiss on the grounds of mental incapacity" claiming that the state's 
evidence showed that he was delusional. The district court denied the motion to 
dismiss but, based on Hawkins' claim of mental incapacity, ordered a 
psychological evaluation pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-2522 for purposes of 
sentencing. The court also declined Hawkins' motion to proceed prose, noting 
that "if Mr. Hawkins is contending that he is delusional, I don't think his decision 
whether to hire or not keep an attorney, at this point, is appropriate." 
At a subsequent hearing, the district court set forth for the record that it had never 
had cause to believe that Hawkins lacked the mental capacity to understand the 
proceedings or to assist in his own defense. The court noted that it had ordered 
the psychological evaluation for sentencing purposes "in an abundance of caution" 
based on the assertions made by Hawkins in his motion to dismiss that had been 
filed shortly after the jury had reached its verdicts. The court further noted that 
Hawkins had failed to participate in the psychological evaluation and, after 
questioning Hawkins, the court determined that Hawkins was asserting his Fifth 
Amendment rights not to participate in such an evaluation. At Hawkins' request, 
the court ordered the public defender to continue to represent Hawkins and set the 
case over for hearing on the multiple post-trial motions that Hawkins had filed pro 
se. At the subsequent motion hearing, Hawkins' counsel advised Hawkins and the 
court that, if asked to argue Hawkins' post-trial motions, his position would be 
that the motions had no merit. Based on counsel's representation, the court 
pem1itted Hawkins to argue his motions pro se, finding once again that Hawkins 
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was competent to waive counsel and that he did so freely and voluntarily. 
Following argument, the district court denied Hawkins' motions. 
The case proceeded to a sentencing hearing, at which Hawkins was represented 
by the public defender. The district court imposed concurrent unified sentences of 
life with thirty years fixed. Hawkins timely appealed. 
State v. Hawkins, 148 Idaho 774, 775-777 (Ct. App. 2009) (footnotes omitted). 
2. The first appeal (No. 35281) 
On appeal, Mr. Hawkins argued that the district court erred in failing to order a 
psychiatric examination to determine Mr. Hawkins' competency to stand trial. (35281 
Appellant's Brief, pp. 18-22.)1 As a remedy, Mr. Hawkins argued that he was entitled to a new 
trial because retroactive competency hearings are disfavored. (35281 Appellant's Brief, p. 22 
(citing Drape v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 183 (1975).) In response, the State argued that "the 
record is devoid of any evidence that would have raised a bona fide doubt about [Mr. Hawkins] 
mental capacity either to understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense, 
such that the district court would have been required to order a competency evaluation on its own 
motion." (35281 Respondent's Brief, p. 13.) The State, however, never addressed Mr. Hawkins' 
claim that if there was error, the proper remedy was to vacate the conviction and remand for a 
new trial. (See 35281 Respondent's Brief, pp. 1-27.) In his Reply Brief, Mr. Hawkins again 
asked that the district court vacate his convictions, leaving the State free to retry him ifhe is 
deemed competent. (35281 Appellant's Reply Brief, p. 4 (citing Drape, 420 U.S. at 183).) 
The Idaho Court of Appeals agreed with Mr. Hawkins. See Hawkins, 148 Idaho at 
777-783. First, the Hawkins Court held: 
1 The Court has ordered the record in this case be augmented by the Court File, 
Reporter's Transcript, and Clerk's Record filed in prior appeals No. 35281 and 38532. 
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Hawkins' behavior and his stories consistently raised questions as to whether he 
had a rational understanding of the proceedings against him even though he 
appeared capable of preparing and arguing his own defense. All of these 
behaviors, statements, and events should have raised a bona fide doubt about 
Hawkins' competency to stand trial and to conduct his own defense. Taking into 
account all of the indicia of bizarre notions demonstrated before trial started, there 
was enough evidence in this case to put the district court on notice that Hawkins' 
competence was in question. Even if the pretrial conduct was insufficient to call 
for a competency evaluation, certainly Hawkins' testimony during the trial 
presented compelling indicia that he was not in touch with reality. When taking 
the entire record into account, the district court should have entertained a 
reasonable doubt about Hawkins' mental competency either to stand trial or to 
represent himself. Therefore, the district court's failure to sua sponte order a 
mental evaluation and make a determination as to Hawkins' competency was an 
abuse of discretion. 
Id. at 782-783. Next, the Court of Appeals stated that the proper remedy was, "[b ]ecause it is not 
possible to retroactively make a determination as to Hawkins' competency at the time he was 
tried, we must vacate the judgment of conviction and leave the state free to retry Hawkins if he is 
found to be competent to stand trial." Id. at 783. 
The State filed a Petition for Review and Brief in Support of Petition for Review with the 
Idaho Supreme Court. (See generally 35281 Petition For Review and Brief in Support of Petition 
for Review.) In its Brief in Support of Petition for Review, the State challenged the standard 
employed by the Court of Appeals in finding that the district court should have sua sponte 
ordered a competency evaluation, and that there was insufficient evidence to raise a doubt about 
Mr. Hawkins' competency. (35281 Brief in Support of Petition For Review, pp. 15-27.) The 
State, however, again neglected to address or argue against the Court of Appeals' determination 
that Mr. Hawkins is entitled to a new trial. (See 35281 Brief in Support of Petition For Review, 
pp. 1-27.) The Supreme Court denied the State's Petition for Review and issued the Remittitur 
commanding the district cou11 comply with the Comi of Appeals' Opinion by vacating Mr. 
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Hawkins' convictions, ordering that a competency evaluation be conducted, and conducting a 
new trial in the event the district court determines that Mr. Hawkins is competent to stand trial. 
(3 5281 Remittitur.) 
3. Proceedings upon remand from The Court of Appeals (No. 38532) 
On remand, the district court ordered competency evaluations to be conducted by Dr. 
Estess and Dr. Sombke. R (38532) 29-30, 34-35, 39-40. In the first competency evaluation 
conducted by Dr. Sombke, he opined that while "Mr. Hawkins did show an adequate level of 
factual understanding of the court process, his ability to effectively and appropriately interact 
with his attorney is extremely impaired." R (38532) 164. Dr. Sombke continued, "[h]is 
delusional belief system is totally controlling his decisions regarding his court case and he is 
currently unable to logically and rationally participate in a court hearing. Furthermore, he does 
not appear capable of interacting with his attorney in a logical and rational manner at this time 
and he is in need of psychiatric treatment." R (38532) 164. Of particular note, Dr. Sombke 
reported that Mr. Hawkins completed the SIRS-2 test which "was designed to evaluate 
malingering and other forms of dissimulation." R (38532) 163. According to Dr. Sombke, "Mr. 
Hawkins' scores indicated that he was responding in a genuine manner and did not show any 
signs of malingering or feigning a mental illness." R (38532) 163. 
On October 15, 2010, Dr. Estess filed a two page "report" indicating that "there is no 
reason why Mr. Hawkins should not be able to confer with his attorney in his own defense and 
satisfy all of the other requirements that would allow him to be adjudicated to be competent to 
stand trial." R (38532) 166-167. At the hearing on Mr. Hawkins' competency determination, 
based upon his discussions with Dr. Estess and the review of other material he was not provided 
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at the time of his initial report, Dr. Sombke changed his mind. T (38532) (11/12/10) p. 20, ln. 22 
- p. 29, In. 2. Dr. Sombke testified that he now believes that Mr. Hawkins is competent to stand 
trial. T (38532) (11/12/10) p. 29, ln. 3-20.) Additionally, Dr. Estess expressed his belief that Mr. 
Hawkins was competent to stand trial back in January of 2008, at the time he was initially tried in 
this case. T (38532) (11/12/10) p. 100, ln. 8-13. 
Following the hearing, the district court determined that Mr. Hawkins was competent to 
stand trial. R (38532) 134-136. Additionally, the district court found that it believed that Mr. 
Hawkins was competent in January of 2008, but "is constrained by the law of the case and is 
bound to follow the remittitur of the Idaho Court of Appeals." R (38532) 134-136. Appointed 
counsel for Mr. Hawkins was then allowed to withdraw from the case after alleging that he had a 
conflict of interest with Mr. Hawkins. See R (38532) 120-124, 137-139, 236-237; T (38532) 
(12/5/10) p. 14, ln. 5-10. Mr. Hawkins then chose to proceed prose, with the district court 
appointing the Ada County Public Defender's Office as standby counsel. T (38532) (12/15/10) 
p. 6, ln. 8 -p. 8, ln. 16. 
The following day, the State filed a Motion for Permission to Appeal, wherein the State 
asked the district court for permission to file an interlocutory appeal and determine that Mr. 
Hawkins was retroactively competent. R (38532) 243-252. At the hearing on the State's Motion 
for Permission to Appeal, while acting prose, Mr. Hawkins stated he had no objection to the 
State's request for an interlocutory appeal because "I would like to see another court take a look 
at exactly what is going on in this Court." T (1/12/11) p. 11, In. 24-p. 12, In. 5. On February 
1, 2011, the district court entered a Memorandum Decision on State's Motion for Permission to 
Appeal and Order Granting State's Motion for Permission to Appeal. R (38532) 272-277. 
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Following the Supreme Court's grant of the State's request for an interlocutory appeal, the State 
filed a Notice of Appeal. R (38532) 367-373. 
4. The interlocutory appeal (No. 38532) 
The Supreme Court on interlocutory appeal held that the Court of Appeals's statement 
regarding the impossibility of determining competency retroactively and the state's freedom to 
retry the defendant was not law of the case and thus not binding on the district court. State v. 
Hawkins, 155 Idaho 69, 74,305 P.3d 513,518 (2013). The Court declined to address Mr. 
Hawkins's argument that the trial court erred in determining that he was retroactively competent 
was not before the Court, stating: "We did not grant a permissive appeal as to whether a 
retroactive competency determination is appropriate in Hawkins's case .... Therefore, we need 
not address this issue." 155 Idaho at 75, 305 P.3d at 519. 
The Court then remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. Id. 
5.lProceedings upon remand from The Supreme Court (No. 41621) 
Upon remand, Mr. Hawkins declined the services of the public defender and asked for 
time to retain private counsel R ( 41621) 24-25. Subsequently, attorney Eric Fredericksen filed a 
Notice of Appearance. R (41621) 88. 
At a status conference, the court took judicial notice of the prior competency proceedings, 
but noted that new counsel would be allowed to cross-examine the state's witnesses and to 
present additional evidence. The court also set a hearing date. R ( 41621) 89-91. 
Mr. Hawkins then filed a motion to declare himself a "needy person" under I.C. §§ 19-
851 ( c) and 19-852 "for purposes of obtaining necessary services and facilities of representation 
in this case." R ( 41621) 93. In particular, Mr. Hawkins asked for funds to obtain an expert 
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witness for the competency hearing. R ( 41621) 98. The court found that Mr. Hawkins was a 
"needy person" for purposes of obtaining necessary services and facilities of representation at 
county expense, subject to prior approval by the court. R ( 41621) 99. In particular, the court's 
order directed counsel for Mr. Hawkins to submit his request for services for prior approval by 
the court. R (41621) 99. 
On June 28, 2013, Mr. Fredericksen filed a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel. R (41621) 
101. Mr. Fredericksen alleged in his affidavit in support of the motion that, "For reasons your 
affiant cannot disclose, Mr. Hawkins desires to move forward in this case without the 
representation of your affiant." R (41621) 104. 
At the hearing on the motion to withdraw, Mr. Hawkins told that the court that he did not 
want Mr. Fredericksen to represent him any longer and stated that he wished to proceed pro se. 
T (41621) (7/3/2013) pg. 9, ln. 20-22. The court noted: 
That kind of presents a conundrum for the court, or a conflict, because the focus 
of this hearing is that the argument that was presented by your attorneys in the 
appeal before the Court of Appeals that you were not competent to essentially 
stand for trial back in January of 2007, I believe in your - when your jury trial was 
held, okay? 
And so that raises a question about your competency then, your competency since 
then, and your competency now, and so if someone is saying that they aren't 
competent, you can understand when they want to represent themselves that 
creates a real conflict in the court's way of looking at this thing. 
T (41621) (7/3/2013), pg. 10, ln. 5-19. The court then stated that it's intention would be to 
appoint the public defender to represent Mr. Hawkins if it were to grant the motion. Mr. 
Hawkins reiterated that he wanted to proceed pro se and not have the public defender appointed, 
even as standby counsel. T (41621) (7/3/2013), pg. 12, In. 13-24. 
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During the Faretta2 colloquy, the court asked Mr. Hawkins whether there was a defense 
expert who had evaluated Mr. Hawkins and was prepared to testify. Mr. Hawkins noted that Mr. 
Fredericksen had contacted an expert, Dr. Robert Cloninger M.D., and that an hourly rate had 
been given by the doctor, but questions of availability still needed to be answered. T (7/3/2013), 
pg. 15, ln. 17-24. 
The state did not take a position on the motion. It did note that Mr. Hawkins needed to be 
competent to represent himself. "I mean, if the court makes it clear to the defendant that ifhe-
if the court makes the finding that he is competent to represent himself, that will be diametrically 
opposed to the position that he is trying to try and take, I guess, that he is not competent and 
needs a new trial." The court stated it shared the state's concern: "You are saying that you were 
incompetent back in 2007, and yet you are proceeding with representing yourself. I mean, that 
can be looked at as a contradiction in terms." T (7/3/2013), pg. 21, ln. 3-9. 
Mr. Fredericksen, who had not yet been excused from representation, noted, "I don't 
think Mr. Hawkins can concede competency merely by wanting to represent himself." "That's a 
decision for Your Honor." T (7/3/2013), pg. 24, ln. 14-19. The Court agreed with defense 
counsel. "Right, I'm not saying that. I'm just saying ... [i]t's a conundrum." T (7/3/2013), pg. 
24, ln. 20-24. 
The court granted defense counsel's motion to withdraw and permitted Mr. Hawkins to 
proceed pro se. It also appointed the Ada County Public Defender as standby counsel. T 
(7/3/2013), pg. 27, ln. 13 - pg. 28, ln 8; R 169; R 177. 
Subsequently, Mr. Hawkins filed several largely unintelligible but creatively captioned 
2 Faretta v. Cal(fornia, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). 
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motions, including the following: 1) "Motion to be Transported and Housed in a Jail Outside of 
Ada and Canyon Counties;" 2) "Motion for Release to House Arrest for Medical and Security 
Reasons;" 3) "Motion to Dismiss" (under ICR 48); 4) "Motion to Strike Competency Hearing 
and Rulings for Prosecutorial Misconduct and Fraud;" 5) "Motion to take Judicial Notice of Prior 
Record and Motion to Take Judicial Notice that this Court, Judge Michael McLaughlin will be 
called as a witness in the upcoming August 29th 2013 hearing due to the fact he made himself a 
witness in the above case by making statements on the record as to the defendant in prior 
proceedings as to his observations and opinions regarding the defendant's psychological, mental 
abilities and behavior," 6) "Motion for the Court to take Judicial Notice of the Jan 7th to 11 th 2008 
Trial Transcripts Motions, proceedings, as to the fact the Prosecutors, Counties direct actions 
cowed the defendant to be denied all of his witness at trial as admitted to in Roger Bournes letter 
dated Jan 24nd 2008 that the Subpoenas were Stopped by Ada County Prosecutors office. This 
unfairly prejudiced the defendant, denied him a fair trial and is a fundamental Constitutional 
violation of due process under 5th and 14th Amendments And Motion to Dismiss Indictment do to 
USCA violation;" 7) "Motion to Dismiss for abuse of discretion by the Courts failure to provide 
counsel after November 12th 20 IO Competency hearing;" 8) "Motion to Dismiss for lack of 
Subject Matter jurisdiction as Defense alleges the Indictment is Invalid;" 9) "Motion for the 
Court to Take Judicial Notice of Prior Procedures and this Courts failure to Grant the defendant a 
Quick and Speedy Trial from August 19th 2006 to Feb 25th 2007 a due process violation of the 
United States Constitution causing this court to lack Subject Matter Jurisdiction and requiring 
dismissal of the indictment as a sua sponte duty of the Court to insure it has jurisdiction;" 10) 
Motion to Dismiss Indictment for Intentional Prosecutorial Misconduct, Fraud, Falsifing Altering 
1 l 
Official Government, Public Record, documents, manufacturing Soliciting Perjured testimony, 
Knowingly, deliberately in bad faith and malice;" 11) "Motion to Dismiss Indictment, case, For 
Prosecutorial Misconduct, Fraud, Falsifing Official Government Record, Soliciting and 
Admitting Known Perjured Testimony Coercion, Creating False Instrument of Record;" 12) a 
second "Motion to Dismiss Indictment, case, For Prosecutorial Misconduct, Fraud, Falsifing 
Official Government Record, Soliciting and Admiting Known Perjured Testimony Coercion, 
Creating False Instrument of Record;" 13) "Motion to Dismiss Indictment;" 14) "Motion to 
Dismiss the indictment and Case For States failure to provide a quick and Speedy trial within 180 
days without waiver;" 15) "Motion to Dismiss Indictment for States Violation of Defendants 
Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel Guarantee;" 16) a third "Motion to Dismiss Indictment, case, 
For Prosecutorial Misconduct, Fraud, Falsifing Official Government Record, Soliciting and 
Admiting Known Perjured Testimony Coercion, Creating False Instrument of Record;" 17) 
"Motion for Release to House Arrest with Ankle monitor do to Counties reckless endangerment 
to defendants health failure to provide local standard of medical care. Medical release to Obtain 
access to medical case;" 18) "Defenses Request for and Motion for Rule 16 Discovery Including 
All Brady Material;"and 19) "Motion for a Motion Hearing to hear all unheard motions." R 
( 4 I 621) 107-159 (spelling, punctuation and capitalization original). 
The court held a status conference on July 17, 2013. Standby counsel from the Public 
Defender's Office appeared. The court read a document entitled "Waiver of Right to Counsel" 
into the record. It found that Mr. Hawkins's waiver of his right to counsel was made knowingly, 
intelligentlyandvoluntarily. T(7/17/2013),pg.13,ln.21-pg.17,ln.12. (Anunsignedcopyof 
the document was filed on July 30, 2013. R (41621) 213.) The court never found that Mr. 
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Hawkins was competent to waive counsel under Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 64 (2008). 
The court then announced that it would "suspend the hearing" on Mr. Hawkins's pending 
motions until it determined whether Mr. Hawkins was competent during the January 2008 trial. 
T (41621) (7/17/2013), pg. 21, In. 15 - pg. 22, In. 2. Upon questioning by the court, Mr. Hawkins 
said that he had not subpoenaed either the state's expert (Dr. Estess) nor his own expert (Dr. 
Cloninger) for the hearing. Mr. Hawkins also stated that Dr. Cloninger had not yet done a 
psychiatric evaluation. T ( 41621 )(7 /17/2013), pg. 22, In. 3 - pg. 23, In. 21. 
Mr. Hawkins stated, by way of explanation for the delay, that Dr. Cloninger's evaluation 
could not be performed without first providing him with the discovery in the case which Mr. 
Hawkins did not possess. T (41621) (7/17/2013), pg. 23, In. 17 - pg. 24, In. 5. The court then 
ordered that prior counsel provide a copy of the discovery to Mr. Hawkins. T (41621) 
(7/17/2013), pg. 27, In. 15-19. 
Finally, the court noted that Mr. Hawkins did not need the discovery in order to cross-
examine Dr. Estess and chastised him for delaying the evaluation. "And so we are on the 29th, 
and you're your own lawyer. And your sitting around waiting for discovery, and discovery is not 
the critical issue." It continued, 
And on the 29th of August, you better be ready to go because at that point in time -
we set this for a hearing, what two-and-a-half, three months ago. So your waiting 
for discovery is not a good-faith basis. It's not a basis for this court to continue 
that hearing. 
Are we clear on that? 
Do you understand that I am not going to delay this hearing due to your request 
for discovery? Do you understand that? 
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THE DEFENDANT: I understand. 
THE COURT: Do you understand that you will need to have your doctor and have 
his evaluation and have him prepared to testify and subpoenaed to testify on 
August 29th at 9:00 clock? 
THE DEFENDANT: I understand. 
T (41621) (7/17/2013), pg. 28, In. 15 - pg. 29, In. 23. 
Subsequently, Mr. Hawkins filed more two motions: 1) "Motion to dismiss due to the fact 
the State can not produce a valid indictment;" and 2) "Motion to Disqualify Judge Michael 
McLaughlin for Cause under Rule 25 And under Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3(E)(l)." R 
214-218 (spelling, punctuation and capitalization original). He also filed a Notice of Appeal. R 
(41621) 220. 
On July 31, 2013, another status conference was held. Mr. Hawkins informed the court 
that Dr. Cloninger had not done an evaluation because he was awaiting confirmation of payment. 
T (41621) (7/31/2013) pg. 136, In. 19-24. The record shows that Mr. Hawkins was unaware that 
he was responsible for arranging preapproval of the fees pursuant to the court's previous order. 
He stated: "He [Dr. Cloninger] is awaiting verification of payment. I don't know how you want 
to work that with regards to what you had previously ordered when Mr. Fredericksen was on 
counsel." T (41621) (7/31/2013) pg. 135, In. 13-17. Upon questioning, Mr. Hawkins told the 
court that he had only been in contact with the doctor through emails, some of which had been 
sent by former counsel. T (41621) (7/31/2013) pg. 136, In. 13-17. 
Mr. Hawkins then told the court that Dr. Cloninger was employed at Washington 
University located in St. Louis, Missouri, that his rate was $450 per hour and that he would also 
require airfare and lodging in order to testify. T ( 41621) (7/31/2013) pg. 13 7, In. 8 - pg. 138, In. 
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15. When asked by the court why he needed an out-of-state expert, Mr. Hawkins explained that 
Dr. Cloninger was considered to be "one of the top ten in the word" and "was considered by the 
Ninth Circuit to be the preeminent expert." T (41621) (7/31/2013) pg. 139, ln.24- pg. 140, In. 4. 
The court then stated concern about the cost: "So, in order for him to do a psychiatric 
evaluation of you, I think he would have to come out and see you, wouldn't he? ... He can't very 
well do a psychiatric evaluation by phone, I wouldn't think." Mr. Hawkins stated that he 
believed the doctor had done video interviews previously. T (41621) (7/31/2013) pg. 140, In. 19-
25. The court then instructed standby counsel to assist Mr. Hawkins in locating an expert within 
500 miles of Boise stating that it could not find that it was reasonable to pay the fees and 
expenses requested by Dr. Cloninger. T (41621) (7/31/2013) pg. 141, In. 24 -pg 142, In. 19. 
Mr. Hawkins subsequently filed a "Motion to reconsider Defendants Request for Dr. 
Robert Cloninger MD for Evaluation." R (41621) 223. Mr. Hawkins argued that the court's 
order excluding the defense's "choice of one of the top psychiatrists in the world simply because 
he lives beyond a 500 mile radius of Boise is ridiculous" and that it "was unreasonable," noting 
that the state obtained the opinions of two evaluators (Drs. Estess and Sombke) while he was 
only allowed one. Id He also filed a "Defense Memorandum of law why the state and this 
Court can not lawfully find the defendant retroactively competent." R ( 41621) 224. 
The court then issued a Memorandum Decision and Order amending its previous order of 
a 500 miles radius to just the communities of Boise, Nampa, Caldwell and Twin Falls. R 
( 41621) 231. The court also ordered Mr. Hawkins to submit the name of the expert to the Court 
on or before August 29, 2013. "Failure to submit the expert by that date could result in the Court 
precluding the defendant from presenting expert testimony at the retroactive competency hearing, 
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unless good cause is presented to the Court." Id. Mr. Hawkins filed an objection to the court's 
further restriction on his choice of defense expert. R ( 41621) 240. 
On October 7, 2013, the court set a hearing on October 17 for the purpose of selecting a 
psychologist or psychiatrist to evaluate the Mr. Hawkins. R (41621) 261. On October 11, 2013, 
Mr. Hawkins mailed a Notice of Defenses Psychiatrist Motion for Payment to Psychiatrist, which 
was not filed until October 21. R (41621) 271-274. This notice listed Dr. Cloninger as the 
defense expert. 
On October 17, 2013, the court held another hearing where the following occurred: 
THE COURT: And so who is it that you would request to conduct the evaluation 
of you, Mr. Hawkins, within the parameters the court set forth in the earlier 
memorandum decision of August 13? 
THE DEFENDANT: Did the court receive my documents? 
THE COURT: I just want you to answer my question. Who is it that you wish to 
have evaluate you? 
THE DEFENDANT: Dr. Robert Cloninger. 
THE COURT: From St. Louis, Missouri? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: That's not going to be ordered. 
T (41621) (10/17/2013) pg. 5, ln. 8-21. 
Mr. Hawkins argued that the court should not be able to "dictate defense choices as far as 
expert witnesses" and that he "had spoken to attorneys that said you can limit the amount of 
money, but you can't limit the locale." The court then appointed Dr. Robert Engle to conduct the 
evaluation. T (41621) (10/17/2013) pg. 6, In. 7-24. 
After consultation with standby counsel, Mr. Hawkins asked, "Would the court allow my 
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parents to pay for Mr. Collinger [sic]?" The court responded that it would be "an entirely 
different matter" if he could make private arrangements for payment, but in the meantime he 
would be required to accept the public defender as counsel. Mr. Hawkins then stated: 
THE DEFENDANT: I don't quite understand that. 
THE COURT: It's real simple. He is going to be your lawyer. He is going to be 
assign to follow through with that task, and you're not going to be able to fire 
him. Do you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: IfI can get Collinger [sic], though. 
THE COURT: No. There's no conditions on this. If we're going to have some 
conditions on this. Then you're either going to submit to Dr. Engle for an 
examination or I'm going to sentence you. You're either going to have Mr. Cahill 
as your attorney unconditionally. Or we're going to go to those other two options 
that I've outlined. What's you're answer? 
THE DEFENDANT: So you're telling me, then, ifhe decides some other doctor-
THE COURT: Absolutely. 
THE DEFENDANT: And I can't fire him? 
THE COURT: That's right. 
THE DEFENDANT: All right. Then you should just sentence me today. That's 
what you should do. 
T (41621)(10/17/2013) pg. 14, In. 20-pg. 15, In. 19. 
Thereafter, the court reimposed the original sentence of life imprisonment with 30 years 
fixed on each count. T (41621) (10/17/2013) pg. 20, In. 10-12; R 280-283. 
Mr. Hawkins filed a timely notice of appeal. R ( 41621) 285, 287. 
III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A Did the 2010 retroactive determination that Mr. Hawkins was competent in January of 
2008 violate due process? 
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B. In the alternative, should this case be remanded for a detern1ination of whether, given 
the Supreme Court decision in Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008), Mr. Hawkins was 
competent to waive his right to counsel? 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court Erred in Determining in 2010 That Mr. Hawkins Was 
Retrospectively Competent Throughout His Trial in January of 2008 
Mr. Hawkins attempted to raise this issue during the state's interlocutory appeal. The 
Supreme Court as noted above, refused to consider it holding that it was outside of the scope of 
the permissive appeal. 155 Idaho at 75,305 P.3d at 519. 
The failure to observe procedures adequate to protect a defendant's right not to be tried or 
convicted while incompetent to stand trial deprives him of his due process right to a fair trial. 
Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966). InDrope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975) the Supreme 
Court held that a state's statutory procedure for determining an accused's mental capacity to stand 
trial must be constitutionally adequate to protect a defendant's due process right not to be tried 
while legally incompetent. 420 U.S. at 173. In Idaho, the procedure for conducting a 
competency evaluation is set out in LC.§§ 18-210 and 18-211. Idaho Code§ 18-211 requires 
that when there is reason to doubt the defendant's fitness to proceed, as set forth in section 
18-210, Idaho Code, the court shall appoint at least one qualified psychiatrist or licensed 
psychologist, who upon completion of an examination of the defendant shall submit a report to 
the court. The report should include an opinion as to the defendant's capacity to understand the 
proceedings against him and to assist in his own defense. LC.§ 18-210(5)(c). The issue of a 
defendant's fitness to proceed is determined by the trial court. 
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The test for determining capacity to stand trial is whether a defendant has sufficient 
present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and 
whether he has a rational, as well as factual, understanding of the proceedings against him. 
Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960); State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 62, 90 P.3d 278, 
287 (2003); State v. Longoria, 133 Idaho 819,822,992 P.3d 1219, 1222 (Ct. App. 1999). 
1. This Court should hold that retrospective competency determinations more than a 
year following the relevant proceeding do not comport with due process 
The United States Supreme Court has never held that a retrospective competence 
determination, over a year after the trial, comports with due process. The first United States 
Supreme Court case to address the issue was Dusky, supra. In Dusky, the Court remanded the 
case to the district court for a new competency hearing because of the "difficulties of 
retrospectively determining the petitioner's competency as of more than a year ago[.]" Id. 362 
U.S. at 403. Next, in Pate, the United States Supreme Court refused to correct the violation of 
Pate's constitutional right to receive an adequate competency determination by remanding the 
case for a retrospective competency determination. Id. 383 U.S. at 386-387. The Pate Court 
reiterated "the difficulty of retrospectively determining an accused's competence to stand trial." 
Id. at 387 (citing Dusky, 362 U.S. at 403). The Court observed, "[t]he jury would not be able to 
observe the subject of their inquiry, and expert witnesses would have to testify solely from 
information contained in the printed record. That Robinson's hearing would be held six years 
after the fact aggravates these difficulties." 383 U.S. at 387. More recently, in Drape v. 
Missouri, supra, the United States Supreme Court stated, "Given the inherent difficulties of such 
a nunc pro tune determination under the most favorable circumstances, we cannot conclude that 
such a procedure would be adequate here." 420 U.S. at 183 (internal citations omitted). 
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Further complicating matters is that "[ m ]ental competency is not a static condition and is 
to be determined 'at the time of trial'." Edwards v. State, 902 N.E. 2d 821 (Ind. 2009). No case 
better represents this problem than the instant case where Mr. Hawkins's retrospective 
competency determination was made 34 months after the conclusion of his trial. 
Accordingly, in light of the problems inherent in retroactive competency determinations, Mr. 
Hawkins asks this Court to hold that the remedy for a competency violation be a new trial 
because of the "difficulties ofretrospectively determining the petitioner's competency as of more 
than a year ago[.]" Id. 362 U.S. at 403. In the rare case where less than a year has passed since 
the trial, the determination of whether a retroactive competency hearing is possible could be 
made on a case-by-case basis. 
2. Assuming the Court does not adopt a per se rule, it was not possible to make a 
retroactive determination of competency in this case given the passage of time 
since the trial, the absence of contemporaneous evidence and the fluid nature of 
mental illness 
Even if this Court does not adopt a per se ban on retroactive competency hearings when a 
year has passed since the trial, it should still find the retroactive competency hearing in this case 
took place after too long of a delay. The United States Supreme Court has observed that 
retrospective determinations of a defendant's competency are disfavored because of "the inherent 
difficulties of such a nunc pro tune determination under the most favorable circumstances." 
Drape, 420 U.S. at 183. 
Mr. Hawkins asserts that, based on the circumstance and facts presented in his case, a 
meaningful and accurate retrospective competence evaluation was not possible. Mr. Hawkins 
was convicted in January of2008 and it was not until December of 2010, 34 months later, that 
the district court rendered a decision that it believed Mr. Hawkins was competent at the time of 
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his trial. As addressed above, the United States Supreme Court has remanded cases to the district 
court for a new competency hearing because of the "difficulties ofretrospectively determining 
the petitioner's competency as of more than a year ago[.]" Id 362 U.S. at 403. 
In addition to the United States Supreme Court, the Court in Blunt v. United States, 3 89 
F.2d 545 (D.C. Cir. 1967), remanded a case for a new competency hearing because the hearing 
was held 32 months prior, which was 10 months before the trial, citing to the difficulties of 
retrospective competence determinations. Id. at 549. See also Leonard v. State, 658 P.2d 785 
(Alaska Ct. App. 1983) (remanding a case for a new competence evaluation just over two years 
after the trial, because "We feel that the difficulty of making a retrospective determination of 
Leonard's competence to stand trial requires that we order a new trial proceeded by a competence 
determination."); People v. Cartagena, 92 A.D.2d 901 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983) (holding that 
"Given the difficulties of determining, nunc pro tune, defendant's fitness to proceed, the post 
conviction hearing, held more than one year and four months after the plea ... could not 
adequately protect defendant's due process right where defendant was not examined for 
competency at the time of the pleas and sentences."). In light of the above, Mr. Hawkins asserts 
that 34 months since the passage of his trial is too long per se for a retrospective competence 
evaluation, especially considering the fluid nature of mental illness. Even the district court 
expressed its concern that if Mr. Hawkins were retried, it would be required "have a psychiatrist 
present during the trial" in case Mr. Hawkins were to act out during the new trial. R (39532) 
274-275. 
Accordingly, Mr. Hawkins asks this Court to vacate the court's order finding him 
competent at the time of trial and remand his case back to the district court for a new trial. 
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B. The District Court Abused its Discretion in Permitting Mr. Hawkins to Proceed 
Without Counsel Without Finding That Mr. Hawkins Was Competent to Proceed Pro 
Se 
As discussed above, the judgment of conviction must be reversed because the retroactive 
competency evaluation here violated due process. In addition, the case must be remanded 
because no separate inquiry was made as to Mr. Hawkins' competency to waive his right to 
counsel and proceed pro se. 
Mr. Hawkins was tried in January 2008, and at that time, the question of the relationship 
between competency to stand trial and competency to represent oneself had not been addressed 
by the United States Supreme Court. And, therefore, nearly all courts, like the court in this case, 
did not make any inquiry into competency prior to allowing a defendant to waive the right to 
counsel. See United States v. Ferguson, 560 F .3d 1060, 1066-67 (9th Cir. 2009). However, in 
June of 2008, the Supreme Court decided Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008). That case 
holds that the question of mental competency to be tried is different from the question of mental 
competency to waive the right to counsel and proceed pro se. A higher standard applies to the 
latter question. The standard by which to measure the competency to be tried is that of having a 
"rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings" and "sufficient present ability to 
consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding." Dusky, 362 U.S. at 
402 (internal quotation marks omitted), as quoted in Ferguson, 560 F.3d 1066. 
The standard for measuring competency to waive counsel is whether the defendant is able 
"to carry out the basic tasks needed to present his own case without the help of counsel." 
Edwards, 554 U.S. at 175-176. "Fm1her, proceedings must not only be fair they must 'appear to 
be fair to all who observe them."' Id (quoting Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 160 
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(1988)), as quoted in Ferguson, 560 F.3d at 1068. As quoted from an amicus brief in Edwards, 
"[H]ow in the world can our legal system allow an insane man to defend himself?" Edwards, 
554 U.S. at 177. The answer to the "conundrum" noted by the district court is this: "No trial can 
be fair that leaves the defense to a man who is insane, unaided by counsel, and who by reason of 
his mental condition stands helpless and alone before the court." Id., quoting Massey v. Moore, 
348 U.S. 105, 108 (1954). 
While this Court has not yet articulated the standard of review applicable to Edward 
challenges, it has said that the decision whether reasonable grounds exist to order a psychological 
evaluation to determine competency to stand trial is reviewed under an abuse of discretion 
standard. State v. Longoria, 133 Idaho at 822, 992 P.2d at 1222; see United States v. Johnson, 
610 F.3d 1138, 1145 (9th Cir. 2010) ("Because Edwards holds that the Constitution "permits" 
inte1fering with a Faretta request for 'gray area' defendants, it suggests an abuse of discretion 
standard."). That question, however, need not be answered here because it never occurred to the 
trial court that there might be a standard other than Faretta to apply to Mr. Hawkins's request to 
proceed prose. Thus, even if the Edwards question is reviewed under the abuse of discretion 
standard, the court clearly abused its discretion here because it failed to correctly perceive the 
question as calling for the exercise of discretion. Rather, it believed that Mr. Hawkins had an 
absolute right to represent himself so long as the waiver of counsel was knowing, intelligent and 
voluntary under Faretta, a notion squarely rejected in Edwards. Further, since the court did not 
reach its decision after considering Edwards, it did not apply the legal standard applicable to the 
specific choices available to it, nor did the court reach its decision by the exercise of discretion. 
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See Weeks v. Western Idaho Health Services, 143 Idaho 834,837, 153 P.3d 1180, 1183 (2007) 
(listing sequence of inquiry to be followed by court when faced with a discretionary decision). 
Moreover, it is obvious that Mr. Hawkins was not able to carry out the basic tasks to 
present his own case. Instead of subpoenaing Drs. Estess and Sombke in order to cross-examine 
them at the competency hearing, Mr. Hawkins filed a multitude of unintelligible motions. 
Instead of having Dr. Cloninger prepare an estimate of fees and submitting that estimate to the 
court for approval, Mr. Hawkins focused on irrelevant matters, such as getting discovery, and 
apparently did nothing to obtain funds to retain his chosen expert, either from the court or from 
his parents. Once the court ruled that it would not allow Dr. Cloninger to be the defense expect, 
Mr. Hawkins did nothing to find another expert. 
In this case, as in Ferguson, the decision to allow the defendant to proceed pro se was 
made without the benefit of the decision in Edwards. In both cases, the trial court did not make 
an inquiry into whether the defendant would be able "to carry out the basic tasks needed to 
present his own case without the help of counsel." Rather, after a Faretta colloquy, the trial 
court allowed the defendant to proceed prose. Ferguson, 560 F.3d at 1064. 
When faced with this situation on appeal, the Ninth Circuit devised a following remedy. 
The Court wrote: 
Here, we follow an analogous pattern [to United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 
125 S.Ct. 738 (2005) and United States v. Ameline, 409 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 
2005)(en bane)] and remand to the district court for the limited purpose of 
determining whether Edwards would have affected the district court's decisions .. 
. . Our decision is guided both by Ameline and by the Supreme Court's 
recognition that "the trial judge ... will often prove best able to make the fine-
tuned mental capacity decision, tailored to the individualized circumstances of a 
particular defendant." Edwards, 128 S.Ct. at 2387, 138 S.Ct. 2379. 
Ferguson, 560 F.3d at 1070 (footnote omitted). 
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In its remand order, the Ferguson court directed the district court to reconsider whether 
its decision would have been different with the benefit of Edwards. In making this decision, the 
district court was allowed to, but not required to, take additional evidence or briefing regarding 
the defendant's state of mind at the relevant times. If the district court found that it would have 
altered its decision to allow the defendant to proceed pro se then the conviction was to be 
reversed and the matter retried with counsel. If the district court found that it would not have 
changed its decision to allow the defendant to proceed pro se, then the conviction and sentence 
should stand. Id. 
Mr. Hawkins requests that the remedy outlined in Ferguson be adopted and that this case 
be remanded to the district court for a determination of whether, given Edwards, the decision to 
allow Mr. Hawkins to proceed pro se in the competency proceedings would have been different 
had the district court considered Edwards. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For all the reasons set forth above, this Court should reverse the finding of retroactive 
competency due to the difficulties in making that assessment due to lapse of time and remand for 
a new trial. Alternatively, the Court should vacate the finding of retroactive competency and the 
imposition of sentence due to the Edwards error and remand for further proceedings with Mr. 
Hawkins represented by counsel to determine whether he is competent to waive his right to 
counsel. 
Respectfully submitted this ( 6~ay of August, 2014. 
~~~~ ~ 
Dennis Benjamin -; 
Attorney for Faron Hawkins 
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